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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

.

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

-vJAN C.

.
.

Case No. 18123

..

GRAHAM,

Defendant-Appellant.

.•

BRIEF OF RESPONDEIJT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was convicted of theft by receiving stolen
property, a second-degree felony,

in violation of Utah

Co~e

Ann., § 76-6-408 (1953), as amended.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
·J

Appellant was tried before a jury and was found
guilty on October 6, 1981 in the Second Judicial District
r

Court, the Honorable John F. Wahlquist presiding.

Appellant

was sentenced October 19, 1981 to an indeterminate term of not
less than one year and not more than 15 years in the Utah
State Prison.

Appellant was placed on probation and

imposition of the prison term was suspended on condition that
appellant serve 40 days in jail and pay $1,250 in restitution
at $50 per month.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an affirmance of appellant's
conviction and sentence.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Appellant was employed as a security guard for a
private company whose clients included Browning Arms Company,
a weapon manufacturer and research company in Mountain Green,
Morgan County, Utah (T. 14).1

Upon arriving at Browning

Arms for his graveyard shift (12-8 a.rn.) security patrol,
appellant would receive a master key which would open all the
doors in the building except one {T. 26).-

Appellant had

access to the gun library, where the Browning Company kept
historical guns and other manufacturers' guns for testing (T.
24).

Included in the gun library was a Browning 9-mm. high-

power pistol with serial number 72089 which appellant was
later charged wfth unlawfully receiving (T. 25).
An annual inventory of the Browning Arms Company
weapons was conducted in December 1979 and was completed by
about December 15 (T. 22).

The Browning pistol, number 72089,

was present when the December 15, 1979 inventory was completed
(T. 22).

Appellant terminated his employment as a security

guard at Browning Arms on January 2, 1980 (T. 16).

1 Although there is a two-volume transcript in this
case, all references herein will be to volume one.
-2Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Because there appeared to be numerous weapons missing, a
special inventory was conducted in September 1980 and the
weapon was listed as missing (State's Exhibit 1).
Appellant was on security duty at night by himself
and he was required to check the building's rooms for securely
locked doors and exits and watch for fires every two hours.
Appellant had access to the gun library.

Appellant did not

have a key to the locked cabinets in the gun library, but that
was not an insurmountable barrier to appellant, as he
explained to a co-worker in the fall of 1979.

Appellant

demonstrated to Trent Petri how it was done:
One door would shut and latch from the
inside, and the other one was shut with a
dead bolt with a key.
If you would push
on the one with the dead bolt, push it in
and hit that latch, both doors would open.
(T. 42).
After ftppellant quit working at Browning Arms, the
security system was changed in February 1980 and a master key
no longer opened the gun library (T. 28).

In the late spring

or early summer of 1980, W. R. Betz, a member of the Browning
Arms Board of Trustees and a Browning gun /specialist, received
a phone call from appellant, who did not identify himself (T.
50).

Appellant asked general questions about the gun after

giving its description and stating it was a lightweight
pistol, but appellant did not give the gun's serial number

-3-
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so Betz had no opportunity to trace the history and ownership
of the pistol.

The same person phoned again about one week

later and gave his name as Jan Graham.

Appellant gave Betz

his phone number but again he did not give the serial number
of the gun {T. 51-53).

Appellant did not reveal the owner of

the pistol even though Betz expressed interest in buying it or
getting a photograph of it (T. 50).
Betz phoned appellant several times to inquire about
the owner of the Browning pistol (T. 52).

Appellant did not

allow Betz to meet the owner or to photograph the gun.
Appellant was ambiguous about the owner of the gun, except
that the owner was a member of appellant's unit of the
National Guard (T. 53).
At a gun show in November 1980 at the Salt Palace in
Salt Lake City, Betz saw the pistol for the first time when
appellant and

(T. 55).

a~pellant's

wife showed him the Browning pistol

Betz recognized the weapon as a prototype, a one-

of-a-kind weapon (T. 55), and immediately checked the serial
number (T. 56).

Betz then reported the serial number to Allen

Carver of Browning Arms, who researched

t~e

Browning Arms

Company sales records but could find no sale of the weapon
with that serial number (T. 57-58).

Betz also wrote to the

factory asking for a serial number trace but did not receive
an answer to his query for six to eight months (T. 59).
-4-
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After the November 4, 1980 phone call from Allen
Carver stating that there was no evidence of a sale of the
Browning pistol with that serial number, Betz phoned appellant
and was tolc1 that appellant's "friend" han decided to sell the
gun (T. 60).

On November 19, 1980 appellant received from

Betz $1,000 cash and a .357 magnum pistol with ammunition in
exchange for the Browning pistol (T. 61).

Betz had appellant

sign a bill of sale which Betz had prepared (T. 61).
Shortly thereafter, Betz,

in consultation with

Browning Arms Company, discovered that the Browning pistol was
on the September 1980 inventory list of stolen guns from the
Browning gun library (T.

62).

On December 2, 1980 Betz gave a

statement (T. 63) to the Morgan County Sheriff, who elicited
the aid of the .Ogden City

Police~Department.

Brad Carver, an

Ogden police detective, talked to appellant on December 5,
1980 and appellapt said he did have possession at one time of
the gunI which- he claimed to have purchased from a National
Guardsman whose name he did not remember (T. 82).

Appellant

voluntarily accompanied Carver to police headquarters, where,
upon entering the police building, he told Carver the name of
./

the previous gun owner, "Jeff Smith" (T. 83).

Appellant then

gave his statement to the police.
Appellant returned to the police department three
days later with an apparent receipt from nJeff Smith" for
-5-
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the sale of the Browning pistol (T. 91}.

Merrill Smith, a

personnel administrator at the National Guard State
Headquarters, searched the Utah National Guard records back to

1973 and he did not find the name of Jeff Smith in any of the
personnel files (T. 91).

In January, 1981 appellant was

charged with theft, to wit:

he unlawfully received, retained

or disposed of a firearm, knowing that the property had been
stolen or believing that it probably had been stolen, with a
purpose to deprive the owner thereof, a conviction from which
he now appeals.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE
JURY'S DETERMINATION THAT APPELLANT WAS
GUILTY OF THEFT BY RECEIVING, RETAINING OR
DISPOSING OF STOLEN PROPERTY.
Appellant contends on appeal that the prosecution
did not establish a prima facie case of theft by receiving
because the prosecution did not prove each element as required
by Utah Code Ann.,§ 76-6-408.

Appellant correctly states

that a "defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed
innocent until each element of the offense charged against him
is proved beyond a reasonable doubt."

Appellant couples this

presumption with his testimony and now assumes that the facts
are to be viewed as he stated them.

By looking only at

-6-
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appellant's testimony and ignoring the other probative
evidence, appellant argues that the evidence was not
sufficient to establish a prima facie case; and it was
therefore not sufficient to submit to the jury, and a motion
to dismiss should have been granted.
Utah Code Ann.,§ 76-6-408(1) (1953), as amended,
provides:
A person commits theft if he receives,
retains, or disposes of the property of
another knowing that it has been stolen,
or believing that it probably has been
stolen, or who conceals, sells, withholds
or aids in concealing, selling, or
withholding any such property from the
owner, knowing the property to be stolen,
with a purpose to deprive the owner
thereof.
Under this theory of theft, the prosecution was required to
prove:

(1) property belonging to another had been stolen;

(2) appellant received, retained or disposed of the stolen
property; (3) at the time of receiving, retaining or disposing
of the· property, appellant knew or believed the- property was
stolen; and (4) appellant acted purposely to deprive the owner
of the possession of the property.
P.2d 399 (1980).

State v. Murphy, Utah, 617

In the present case,

th~

jury fauna that the

evidence was sufficient to establish these elements beyond a
reasonable doubt.
In reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, it is
well established that it must appear that reasonable minds
-7-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt that appellant
committed the crime.
(1977).

State v. Wilson, Utah, 565 P.2d 66

Unless evidence compels a conclusion that as a matter

of law evidence was inconclusive or so unsatisfactory that
reasonable minds acting fairly must have entertained
reasonable doubt that appellant did not commit the crime, the
verdict must be sustained.

State v. Newbold, Utah, 581 P.2d

991 (1978); State v. Mills, Utah, 530 P.2d 1272 (1975).

The

evidence need not refute contrary allegations made by
appellant if the verdict is supported by substantial evidence.
State v. Lamm, Utah, 606 P.2d 229 (1980); State v. Howell,
Utah,

P.2d

(Case No. 17407, decided June 30, 1982).

The evidence, and all inferences that may reasonably be drawn
therefrom, is to be viewed in the light most favorable to the
fact finder's verdict.
(1979).

State v. Garlick, Utah, 605 P.2d 761

It is not the prerogative of this Court to weigh the

evidence, but that of the fact finder to assess its weight and
sufficiency.

State v. Romero, Utah, 554 P.2d 216 (1976).
r

Appellant claims that the prosecution fa'iled to
present sufficient proof of three elements of the crime:
(1) there was no evidence that the Browning high-powered
pistol had been stolen; (2) there was no evidence that
appellant had knowledge that the pistol was stolen; and
(3) there was no evidence that appellant had acted purposely
to deprive the owners of the possession of the arown1ng
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pistol.

The one element of theft by receiving, retaining or

disposing stolen property which appellant concedes is that
appellant had possession and disposed of the pistol.
Appellant argues that there never was any direct
evidence to prove the element that the property of another had
been stolen, but that the evidence merely indicated the
-Browning pistol was "missing."

It is not a significant matter

that witnesses stated the Browning pistol was "missing" rather
than "stolen."

Regardless of the semantic label attached, the

evidence reveals that the Browning pistol was a prototype,
one-of-a-kind, which was locked in a display cabinet in the
Browning Arms Company gun library.

There was direct evidence

that after a September 1980 inventory, the Browning pistol was
onv·a,stolen~weapons·-list·:given

to the

FBI,~indicating

that the

Browning pistol was· stolen and was not merely misplaced or
"missing.":":.· Other direct

~evidence

included· the testimony that

the Browning pistol had not been sold and that the Browning
Arms records did not show that the pistol had been properly
borrowed by an authorized person.
Circumstantial evidence of the element that the
./

property of another had been stolen also -was presented by the
prosecution.

The Browning pistol was sold by appellant, who

had easy access as a security guard to the weapons

in

the

Browning Arms gun library, although appellant was not
authorized to borrow or possess the pistol.

Appellant also

-9Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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demonstrated to other security guards how to unlock the gun
cabinets by pushing on the doors and hitting the latches.
There was also evidence of security problems at Browning Arms
Company which appellant understood and which he could take
advantage of without difficulty.

Appellant had ample

opportunity to unlawfully take the Browning pistol as ·he was
on duty by himself during the graveyard (12-8 a.m.) security
watch.

The prosecution is not required to present evidence

that appellant stole the Browning pistol, but must show that
the pistol was stolen property.

By looking at the facts and

circumstances of appellant's employment as a security guard at
Browning Arms Company, there is an indication that the pistol
was stolen.

From the direct and circumstantial evidence

presented in this case, the ju·ry cou1a· rea'sonably- believe that·
the pistol was stolen, regardless of who actually stole the
pistol from Browning Arms

Company~

Appellant also claims that the pistol could have
been "raffled" or given to a Browning Arms employee, but this
is mere speculation and highly unlikely that a weapons
manufacturer would give away a rare and valuable pistol
,,,

instead of placing it in the company's historical gun library.
There is no evidence that Browning Arms gave the gun away and
the jury was entitled to believe that Browning Arms had not
done so.
The prosecution also offered evidence of the element
of knowledge, which appellant claims was not shown by direct
-10-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

or circumstantial evidence.

Guilty knowle~ge that the pistol

received, retained or disposed of was stolen can be proved by
inferences and circumstances.
226 P. 465 (1924).

State v. Zeman, 63 Utah 422,

Knowledge that property was stolen can

seldom be proved by direct evidence and resort must be made to
circumstantial evidence; however, no distinction is made
between direct and circumstantial evidence in degree of proof
required.

Dutton v. State, 581 P.2d 856 (Nev. 1978); Russel

v. State, 583 P.2d 690 (Wyo. 1978).
Appellant denies knowledge that the property was
stolen because of an alleged purchase from "Jeff Smith."
surprisingly, Smith's whereabouts are unknown.

Not

Appellant's

explanation is an old one--the pistol was acquired from a
person who could never be located.

The fact that appellant

denies knowledge that the·-Browning pistol was stolen does not
end the matter; it is just another fact and circumstance to be
·)

considered by the jury.
(10th Cir. 1980).

United States v .. Luman, 624 F.2d 152

The United States Supreme Court has held

that possession of recently stolen property,
satisfactorily explained,

if not

is a circumstance from which the

jury may properly draw an inference and find that the person
in possession knew the property had been stolen.

Barnes v.

United States, 412 U.S. 837 (1973).
Moreover, whether the evidence of appellant's
knowledge that the pistol was stolen is labeled as direct or
-11Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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circumstantial is of no consequence.

In Holland v. United

States, 348 U.S. 121 (1954), reh. denied, 348 U.S. 932 {1954),
the court stated that circumstantial evidence is intrinsically
no different from direct evidence:
In both instances, a jury is asked to
weigh the chances that the evidence
correctly points to guilt against the
possibility of inaccuracy or ambiguous
inference.
In both, the trier of fact
must use its experience with people and
events in weighing the probabilities.
If
the fact finder is convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt, we can require no more.
Holland, 348 U.S. at 140.
P.2d

See also:

State v. Clayton, Utah,

(Case No. 17518, decided May 6, 1982).
In the present situation, the Browning pistol

apparently was stolen shortly after an annual inventory in
December 1979.

Over a period of several months beginning in

late spring or early summer of- 1980, appellant tried to obtain
information on the Browning pistol and to determine if the
Browning Arms Company had discovered that the weapon was
missing.

Appellant cautiously proceeded to gather

information, phoning Betz, an expert on Browning weapons, but
never giving Betz the serial number of the pistol and leaving
,

his name and phone number only in subsequent phone calls.
Appellant refused to give the name of the gun's owner to Betz
and did not show Betz the weapon until November 1980.
Appellant attended gun shows and asked gun dealers about the

-12-
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values of Browning pistols.

When Betz told appellant that

Browning Arms had not yet been able to find any sales record
of the Browning pistol, appellant acted and it was clearly to
his belief to quickly dispose of the weapon while Browning
Arms personnel did not know the weapon was stolen.
Appellant's careful gathering of information on the Browning
pistol, his sale to Betz months later when Browning Arms
Company had not yet discovered that the pistol was stolen and
the questionable, improbable explanation of appellant's
possession was sufficient evidence to be submitted to the jury
on the element of guilty knowledge that the weapon was stolen.
Appellant argues that the prosecution did not
establish sufficient evidence of guilty knowledge because the
prosecution did not introduce the original thief to testify,
implying.that a necessary element of the crime of receiving
stolen property is that the State prove someone other than
·}

appellant stole the pistol, which presumably would establish a
guilty knowledge nexus between the original

thie~

and the

appellant charged with receiving the stolen property.
However, a eonviction under

§

76-6-408 does not

require that the actual theft be proven by the prosecution.
The original theft is not an element of the crime.
supra.

~urphy,

Nor is the original thief required to testify on the

element of appellant's guilty knowledge, as this element can
be proved by circumstantial evidence.

The prosecution need

-13Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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not prove that the pistol was stolen by someone other than
appellant in a conviction for receiving stolen property.
State v. Watkins, 481 P.2d 689 (Mont. 1971).
Appellant also argues that a presumption of guilty
knowledge of appellant was not shown by the prosecution.

It

is the State's position that these presumptions were never
invoked at the trial because the facts of the present case do
not correspond to any one of the four theories of presumption
of guilty knowledge as listed in

§

76-6-408.

However, simply

because the instant facts do not invoke a presumption of
guilty knowledge does not preclude a finding of guilty
knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt that the pistol was
stolen, as the jury could reasonably believe.
The third element of receiving stolen property which
appellant alleges was not established is acting purposely to
deprive the owner of the possession of the property.
Appellant bases this claim on his testimony that he bought the
pistol and was the rightful owner.

Whether appellant was the
r

rightful owner was disputed at trial and was a fact to be
detemined by the jury.

Appellant's testimony is not

conclusive simply because he claims to be the owner of the
pistol.

The facts and circumstances indicate that appellant

was not the rightful owner and the jury could reasonably
believe so.

The jury could find that by selling the Browning

pistol to Betz, appellant intended to act purposely to
-14Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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deprive the owners of the possession of the pistol.

A sale of

property by a person not the rightful owner lessens the
likelihood that the true owner will recover the stolen
property.

Thus, the jury could reasonably find that appellant

acted purposely to deprive the owners of the possession of the
pistol.
Appellant's only defense at trial was his own
testimony and he now argues that his testimony alone serves to
destroy all the other-evidence, leaving the State without an
established prirna facie case.

It is the respondent's position

that a prima facie case was established when the prosecution
presented some evidence on each element of the crime; it was
then the jury's responsibility to weigh the evidence and
~;,··ae·cide -on~·a

verdict1···which-~cannot

be overturned· u·nless

reasonable minds must have had reasonable doubt.

~-

Newbold,

supra.
. •}

Appellant said he met "Jeff Smith" in August 1980 at
a National Guard Armory in West Jordan and that they talked
about the Browning pistol.

Appellant stated that "Smith"

wanted $350 for the pistol, which he was selling because he
was going to move.

Appellant then claims to have made his

first telephone contact with Betz.

Appellant claims he saw

both "Jeff Smith" and Betz at the November gun show in Salt
Lake City.

He said "Smith" still had the gun for sale and

loaned it to appellant to show Betz.

When Betz telephoned

-15Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

about one week after the gun show and offered $1,000,
appellant claims "Smith" also phoned about the same time.
Appellant said he then bought the gun from "Smith" and sold it
to Betz.
The jury properly regarded appellant's self-interest
as a factor in judging the credibility of appellant's
testimony.

The jury was not obliged to believe appellant's

claim that he purchased the Browning pistol from "Jeff Smith."
The jury is entitled to believe or disbelieve witnesses.
State v. Fort, Utah, 572 P.2d 1387 (1977).
Betz, a retired member of the U.S. Air Force , a
member of the Board of Trustees of Browning Arms Company,
executive director of the Browning Gun Collector's Association
and a specialist in Browning:weapons, said appellant phoned
him in late spring or early summer of 1980 about a
lightweight, Browning pistol, while appellant claims he did
nqt see the pistol until August 1980 and he also claims that
he did not handle the pistol at that time.

The phone calls

interested Betz, who desired to see the pistol or obtain a
photograph of it, but appellant claimed this was not possible
because appellant did not have the

pistol~

/

Appellant did tell

Betz and Officer Carver that the owner of the pistol was a
member of appellant's National Guard unit.
Upon entering the Ogden police station, appellant
told Officer Carver that he remembered the name of the
pistol's owner, "Jeff Smith."

Admittedly such person could
-16-
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exist except for the fact that ·he was nowhere to be found and
was not listed in the Utah National Guard records.
During the conversation with Officer Carver and in
the statement appellant gave at police headquarters, appellant
did not mention a bill of sale he supposedly received when he
purchased the pistol from "Jeff Smith."

Certainly, the first

step in exculpating oneself from an allegation of theft by
receiving stolen property would be to show Officer Carver the
receipt immediately when appellant was suspected of the crime.
This apparently entered appellant's mind only after the
conversation with Officer Carver and after reflecting on the
bill of sale appellant signed for Betz when appellant solo the
pistol to Betz on November 19, 1980.

Three days after talking

to Officer Carver·, appellant returned to the police department
with.a_ bill

of.~.sale."

The.signatures were writte-n in:the same

color of ink and apparently in the same handwriting.

It was

·J

the_ jury's prerogative to .give this evidence whatever weight
it felt it deserved.
Appellant's testimony also indicates a number of
highly unlikely coincidences.

He claims "Jeff Smith" wanted

to sell the Browning pistol in August because he needed the
money to move.

Appellant claims to have been interested in

purchasing a Browning pistol for about a year, and when he did
find someone willing to sell, appellant did not get a name or
phone number, so appellant had no opportunity to contact
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"Smith."

Later, appellant discovered "Jeff Smith" at a gun

show, and "Smith," who desperately needed to move, had still
not sold the pistol and apparently had not moved, although it
was three months later.
Appellant claims that "Jeff Smith," someone who
appellant alleged he had talked to for only one brief time
before and whose name appellant could not even remember,
agreed to allow appellant to "borrow" the pistol and walk away
at a convention center with thousands of people milling around
the gun show displays.

It is highly unlikely that any "John

Doe" or "Jeff Smith" would have such high _trust in his fellow
human beings.

The jury could reasonably believe that the

alleged owner of a valuable pistol would not lend it to a
stranger, but would walk with appellant to Betz's Browning gun
display to inquire of the pistol's value.

Appellant's wife,

who appellant himself claims was present when he allegedly
--

talked to "Jeff Smith," was not called as a witness, nor was
any other person who could verify the existence of "Smith."
CONCLUSION
The record is replete with evidence that appellant
committed theft by receiving, retaining or disposing of stolen
property.

The jury had an opportunity to hear the testimony

and was in the best position to assess the witnesses'
credibility from their demeanor and responses to questions.
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This Court is obliged to assume· that the jury believed those
aspects of evidence, and drew those inferences that reasonably
could be drawn therefrom, in the light favorable to the
vera i ct.
Based upon the foregoing, respondent urges that the
conviction and sentence of appellant be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this

rrct\

day of July,

19 82.
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